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Abstract—Traditional text-based password schemes are 
inherently weak.  Users  tend  to  choose  passwords   that  are  
easy  to remember, making  them susceptible  to various  attacks  
that  have matured over  the  years.  ObPwd [5] has tried to address 
these issues by converting user-selected digital objects to high-
entropy text passwords  for user  authentication. 
In  this  paper,   we  extend  the  ObPwd  scheme  with  a  new 
object   based   password    scheme   that    performs  majority   of 
the   computation  at   the   server   side.   This   paper   essentially 
discusses   two  frameworks  for   object   password   schemes,   an 
object  hash-based scheme  (where  the  client  machine  computes 
the  hash  of  the  object  to  be  used  as  text  password)   and  an 
object-based scheme  (where  the  object  is  directly  transmitted 
to  the  server  as  password).  We  also  evaluate  the  performance 
of  both   the   object   password    schemes   against   conventional 
text-based password  schemes using prototypes  of each of the 
frameworks.  Implications   with  respect to  ease  of use,  sharing 
and  security  are  also discussed. 
 
Index Terms—password, media, object-hash,  security, hash, 
authentication. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Users pay insufficient attention to wisely choose a pass- 
word. This tendency has been exploited using simple attacks 
like password guessing to more specialized methods such as 
dictionary attacks [8]. The loopholes of text-based passwords 
are well documented [10], [15], [16], [19]. It is also difficult 
for users to generate and memorize strong or high-entropy 
passwords. Further, these strong passwords are generally us- 
able only if they are frequently used. Passwords for rarely-used 
services are hard to reproduce at a later point in time. 
In ObPwd [5], Mannan et.al. attempted to address these 
issues by instructing the users to use digital objects as pass- 
hash computation. This approach is beneficial for the low end 
client machines with insufficient processing power. 
Object hash-based scheme: This scheme involves the 
computation of the object hash on the client system. The hash 
is then transmitted to the server for verification and login. 
The basic idea of object hash-based scheme is essentially the 
same as ObPwd [5]. However, a stronger hash function is 
used in this scheme, i.e. SHA-256, instead of SHA-1 used in 
ObPwd. Furthermore, ObPwd uses PwdHash [18] for 
converting hash values into a 12 characters long alphanumeric 
password and restricts the object size between 30 and 100,000 
bytes. The object hash-based scheme is free from any such 
restrictions. 
We have developed three prototype frameworks which fol- 
low  the  client-server architecture for  text,  object-hash and 
object based password schemes. Client-side scripts are writ- 
ten in JavaScript whereas PHP scripts are deployed on the 
server  along  with  a  MySQL database. The  database stores 
user account details; user-IDs, password hashes and 128-bit 
salts in particular. Using the prototype implementations of the 
frameworks we evaluate the performance of both the object 
password schemes against conventional text-based password 
scheme. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §II describes 
the state of the art. §III discusses the design and prototype 
of different frameworks. In §IV we discuss the usage flow 
of different schemes in the prototype deployed on the web 
server. In §V we demonstrate the effectiveness and complexity 
of object based password schemes using system evaluations. 
In §VI we discuss how the different password schemes offer 
certain benefits over one  another. Finally we  conclude the
words. ObPwd  converts the user-selected digital objects to 
high-entropy text  passwords for  user  authentication. These 
paper in §VII.         
II.  R
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digital objects may include images, videos, audio, documents 
and e-books in different formats. Essentially such passwords 
are not only easy to remember through semantic clues, but are 
also impossible to crack in linear time [2] when accompanied 
by a secure hash function coupled with unique media objects. 
In this paper, we extend ObPwd with a new object based 
password scheme that performs majority of the computation at 
the server side. This paper essentially presents two frameworks 
that leverage digital objects as password; 1) an object hash- 
based scheme and 2) an object-based scheme. 
Object-based scheme: In this scheme the digital object is 
directly transmitted to the server where all computation takes 
place. This incurs a network overhead but frees the client of 
Numerous efforts have been made over the years by the 
scientific community to strengthen passwords and to enhance 
their usability. A few noteworthy efforts include [4], [6], [7], 
[9], [11], [12], [20], [21]. In this section we have primarily 
focused on the most relevant object based password scheme. 
The idea of using digital objects as password was first 
realized in ObPwd by Mannan et.al. [5], [14]. It allows users 
to generate passwords from digital content that may range 
from a personal collection of photographs to static content 
from the web. The Internet Archive (www.archive.org) and 
Google Books (books.google.com) were recognized as good 
object selection pools. A prototype browser based plug-in was 
developed that computed object hashes on the client machine.
The resulting hash string could be copied to the clipboard and 
used as a text-based password by the user. It allows the hash 
to be recorded (because of its textual nature) on any medium, 
and also allowed the hash to be recomputed, provided the same 
object could be reproduced by the user. 
In this paper, we extend ObPwd scheme with a new object 
based password scheme that offloads majority of computation 
at the server side. This approach is beneficial for the low end 
client machines with insufficient processing power. 
 
III.  FRAMEWORK DESIGN AND PROTOTYPE 
 
We have developed prototypes of three different password 
schemes; 1) text-based, 2) object hash-based and 3) object- 
based. The framework design and prototypes are discussed in 
the following subsections. 
 
A. Text-Based Password Scheme 
Text-based passwords have been used since ancient times to 
allow (or disallow) a person or group to enter an area. They 
have since been adopted by information system designers to 
serve the same purpose of authentication and gaining access 
to a resource. 
Fig. 1 shows how a standard text-based password scheme 
is  realized  to  authenticate any  user  over  the  web.  A  user 
supplies their credentials (a user-ID and password) through a 
web form to authenticate themselves to an information system 
and to gain access to its online services. The user-ID and 
password are delivered to the authenticating web-server, which 
then decides whether the supplied credentials are correct or 
incorrect. 
 
 
Fig. 1.    Text-based password scheme. 
 
 
While  spoofing may  be  mitigated  using  SSL,  text-based 
passwords still leave the door open for many other attacks. 
Most of these attacks arise because of the user’s choice of 
passwords. Text-based passwords actually have to be 
remembered, imposing a memory load on the user that they 
would otherwise wish to avoid. Enterprises place various 
restrictions on the user’s choice of password (length, numeric 
or special characters) so  that they may choose stronger, 
more secure passwords. This technique is not very effective 
however, as users still look for the easiest password they can 
construct given the restrictions. Meanwhile attackers can 
compute special tables with most common user passwords 
and use them to break into user accounts [17]. 
For the prototype of text-based scheme, the server maintains 
a list of user-IDs and their respective password hashes in a 
database. Passwords are not stored as plain-text to account for 
any possibility of the database being compromised, in which 
case the attacker would have access to every user account on 
the system. An attacker may still however employ rainbow 
tables to crack these password hashes, and to mitigate such 
an attack, a key derivation function using salts is employed. 
A salt is a randomly generated string that is generated with 
each new user account that is created. 
Upon an authentication request, the server fetches the cor- 
responding password hash and salt stored against the user- 
ID. It then concatenates the salt with the password, computes 
the hash and validates it against the hash fetched from the 
database.  The  cryptographic hash  function  utilized  here  is 
SHA-256, from the SHA-2 family. 
B. Object Hash-Based Password Scheme 
The  object  hash-based password scheme employs media 
objects as user’s passwords and performs majority of the 
computation on the client using client-side scripts. 
As it can be seen from Fig. 2, the server side functionality 
is consistent with that of the text-based password scheme. The 
server receives the user-ID and a text-based version of the user 
password (hash of the media object), fetches the password hash 
and salt from the database and evaluates whether the received 
credentials are valid. 
 
 
Fig. 2.    Object hash-based password scheme. 
 
This scheme allows the user to maintain a text-based version 
of their chosen media object on a non-digital medium, in case 
their media object is unavailable at any point in time. This 
would be highly useful if and when the media object were to 
become corrupted, and also when the user would be trying to 
gain access to a service from a system not of their own, and 
the media object would either be unavailable or could possibly 
be compromised if loaded on a 3rd party computer. 
The server-side implementation is identical to that of the 
text-based password scheme. The server receives the  user- 
ID and a text-based version of the media object as opposed 
to the password in plaintext from the text-based scheme. 
However, since both of them are strings (character sequences), 
the subsequent computation is the same. 
The  client  on  the  other  hand  requires  some  additional 
computation. A hash value (using SHA-256) is computed for 
the media object using a client-side script written in JavaScript.
The basic idea of this scheme is essentially the same as 
ObPwd [5]. However, we use a stronger hash function i.e. 
SHA-256, instead of SHA-1 used in ObPwd. Further, ObPwd 
use PwdHash [18] for reducing the hash values into a  12 
characters long alphanumeric password and restricts the object 
size between 30 and 100000 bytes. Our solution does not apply 
any such restrictions. 
 
C. Object-Based Password Scheme 
We extend the ObPwd scheme with a new object based 
password scheme that performs majority of the computation 
at the server side. 
This scheme extends the previous object hash-based scheme 
in such a way that majority of the computation is offloaded at 
the server side. In this scheme the media object selected by 
the user is directly sent to the server without any processing 
at the client side. 
Fig. 3 highlights the differences of the object-based scheme 
with the text-based and the object hash-based schemes. When 
the  digital  object  is  transmitted, the  server  takes  over  the 
responsibility of computing the initial hash of the object. Once 
the text-based representation of the object is produced (i.e. the 
hash of the object), the server proceeds to validate authenticity 
of user based on the produced string. 
 
 
Fig. 3.    Object-based password scheme. 
 
In this scheme the client is not required to perform any 
processing, and it is only responsible for uploading the media 
object to the server. Once the object is uploaded, a server-side 
script written in PHP computes the hash of the object using 
SHA-256, the produced hash we refer to as the password. As 
per the other schemes, the server retrieves the hash of the 
password and the salt from the data, re-hashes the password 
after concatenating it with the salt, and evaluates whether the 
user entered media object is valid. 
This scheme is beneficial when the client machine does not 
have sufficient processing power, for e.g. when the client is 
using a dumb terminal or a mobile device. 
IV.  USAGE FLOW OF DIFFERENT SCHEMES 
 
The flow for the object hash-based and the object-based 
schemes is illustrated in this section using screen captures. The 
prototype allows the user to login with either of the schemes 
after initial registration. We have deployed the prototype on a 
live web server available at [3]. 
1) Sign-Up:  The client types in a username and selects a 
file as their password (see Fig. 4). In our prototype, both the 
object hash and object-based schemes share the same sign-up 
screen. The object file is transmitted to the server where it is 
processed and after multiple hashes it is stored in the database. 
 
 
Fig. 4.    Sign-up form. 
 
2) Login using Object:  The user logs in using the object- 
based scheme by simply typing in their username and selecting 
their object file (see Fig. 5). The object file is transmitted to 
the server where its hash is computed, a salt is applied and 
the resultant string is rehashed to be compared to the string 
stored in the database. The user gains access to the system if 
the hashes match. 
 
 
Fig. 5.    Login with object-based scheme. 
 
 
3) Login using Object Hash:  Logging in using the object 
hash-based scheme involves a two-step procedure. The user 
first computes the hash of the object by selecting their pass- 
word object (see Fig. 6). The hash is computed on the client 
system using JavaScript and the resultant hash is produced in 
the text-box. If the user already has the object hash stored 
away somewhere and opts to copy from there, they may skip 
this screen and proceed to the login screen. 
 
 
Fig. 6.    Compute object hash. 
 
Once the object hash is computed, it is copied to the 
clipboard and entered into the login screen (see Fig. 7). The 
user  can  also  keep  a  copy  of  the  object  hash  on  another
medium in case their password object are unavailable at any 
point in time. 
 
 
Fig. 7.    Login with object hash-based scheme. 
 
 
V.  EVALUATIONS 
 
This section presents the performance evaluation of user 
authentication using prototype implementations of three 
different password schemes. Our evaluations focus on: 1) 
authentication delays and 2) system performance i.e. impact 
of using digital objects as passwords on CPU, memory and 
overall throughput. 
 
A. Authentication Delays 
 
Authentication time is the time since the request is sent till 
the user is authenticated to the server. The time is logged when 
the client sends a login request and is posted to the server. 
Once all the computation (hashing, fetching from database) is 
completed and the user is authenticated, the server computes 
the elapsed time. In our evaluations the authentication delays 
are taken as an average of several measurements. 
In  order  to  measure the  authentication delays  the  client 
is equipped with a 1 MB/s connection, and at the time of 
evaluations exhibits an average download speed of 0.76 Mbps, 
and an upload speed of 0.22 Mbps. The web server utilizes 
Intel Xeon E5620 (2.40GHz) processors whereas the client 
sports an Intel Core i3-2120 (3.30 GHz) processor. 
1) Text-Based Password Scheme: In this scheme, the user is 
authenticated to the server on average in 1.4914 seconds. This 
includes network transmission time, time to retrieve the user 
record from the database, concatenation of salt and application 
of the hash function. The server computes the SHA-256 hash 
(on the password concatenated with the 128-bit salt) in 0.001 
seconds. 
 
 
Fig. 8.    Authentication time (sec) using object hash-based scheme. 
2) Object Hash-Based Password Scheme:  Performance of 
the object hash-based scheme is similar to that of the text- 
based scheme. On average, the time to authenticate the user 
is 1.4937 seconds (across all file formats and file sizes within 
our test range) against the 1.4914 seconds using the text-based 
scheme (see Fig. 8). 
A direct relationship between file types and authentication 
time  cannot be  established. Objects are  hashed in  approx- 
imately the  same time irrespective of  their file types. The 
client takes only marginally longer to compute hashes of larger 
objects (file size greater than 1000 KB). 
The  time  to  compute  the  additional  object  hash  on  the 
client is very small as compared to the overall time to 
authenticate the user. It is important to note here that the time 
to authenticate is in the order of seconds whereas the time to 
compute the hash is in the order of milliseconds. 
3) Object-Based Password Scheme:  The time to 
authenticate the user using the object-based scheme is 
dominated by the object upload time. Increasing file sizes 
directly impacts authentication times (see Fig. 9). This is due 
to the increased network transmission times. The time to 
compute the object hash on the server is negligible. File 
types once again prove not to influence authentication or 
hashing times. 
 
 
Fig. 9.    Authentication time (sec) using object-based scheme. 
 
 
B. System Performance 
To analyze the system performance of user authentication 
with text, object-hash and object based password schemes, we 
augment a local server with the three passwords schemes and 
measure their impact. We setup a server locally on 2.33 GHz 
Core2Duo machine with 2GB of RAM. In order to measure 
the  impact  of  CPU  and  memory the  server  is  bombarded 
with  1,200  login  requests  for  a  period  of  10  minutes  (2 
requests per second). The experiment is repeated for each of 
the password schemes. The requests are produced by JMeter 
[1] deployed on another system on the LAN. 
 
It is pertinent to note that recordings of the object hash- 
based schemes are also valid for the text-based scheme since 
their functioning on the server-side is identical. 
 
1) Impact on CPU Usage:  To isolate the impact on CPU 
usage we monitor only the Apache process running on the
server machine. Isolating the process also ensures CPU usage 
is  0%  in  idle state. CPU  consumption on  average for  the 
object-based scheme is 6.14% (see Fig. 10). The object hash- 
based scheme on the other hand only consumes (on average) 
0.69% of the CPU for the same experiment. The higher CPU 
usage for the object-based scheme can be attributed to the fact 
that all object hashes are computed on the server whereas on 
the object hash-based scheme the responsibility is delegated 
and distributed among the clients. To interpret these results it 
can be stated that usage of digital objects as password does 
not have a significant impact on the CPU load. 
3) Throughput:  In  order  to  measure  the  throughput  of 
different password schemes, 2 clients concurrently and 
continuously bombarded the  server  with  login  requests 
(using JMeter) over a period of 10 minutes on localhost 
setup (2.33 
GHz Core2Duo machine with 2GB of RAM). The number 
of requests divided by the time difference from the first to 
the last requests gives the throughput in requests per second. 
Even with bombardment of login requests the server is able 
to successfully handle 41.6 requests/second for object hash- 
based scheme (also valid for the text-based scheme since their 
functioning on the server-side is identical). For the object- 
based scheme the average throughput was 2.2 requests/second 
(with 1000 KB objects). This comparatively low throughput 
is because of the time required to send the objects to the 
server. Furthermore, since all the computation is handled by 
the server, the throughput very gradually keeps decreasing with 
time and ends up averaging to 2.2 requests/second over 10 
minutes.
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.    CPU time of Apache process for each scheme. 
 
2) Impact on Memory: Memory usage is identical for much 
of  the  10  minute  period  for  both  object  hash  and  object- 
based schemes (see Fig. 11 and 12). Memory consumption 
however, on average, is 2.34% higher than the idle state in 
either scheme with 2 gigabytes of memory available. In the 
end we can conclude that object based password schemes have 
no significant effect on CPU and memory resources. 
 
 
Fig. 11.    Percentage of memory used for each scheme. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12.    Memory used in megabytes for each scheme. 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
The three password schemes discussed previously (text- 
based, object hash and object-based) offer certain benefits over 
one another, a discussion on which is produced here. 
 
A. Performance 
Object  hash  and  object-based password  schemes  exhibit 
computational overheads in computing the hash of the media 
object. The computation (hashing) time is negligible however; 
standard laptops and desktop computers can compute hashes 
in the order of milliseconds and servers are already optimized 
to compute hashes of text-based passwords to be stored in the 
database. 
A significant network cost is incurred in the case of object- 
based password schemes because the media object requires to 
be sent to the server for further computation. This scheme may 
be beneficial when the client machine does not have sufficient 
processing power, for e.g. when the client is using a dumb 
terminal or a mobile device. 
 
B. Ease of Use 
Text-based password schemes offer familiarity to users, they 
however are not the easiest to use. Password construction at the 
time of signing up for a service is a cumbersome task because 
of various restrictions placed upon the length of the password 
and because of restrictions that specify what a password must 
(or must not) contain. Strong text-based passwords are also 
difficult to remember, even more so when there are multiple 
passwords to remember. 
Object hash  and  object based password schemes on  the 
other hand may not offer familiarity, but constitute a much 
simpler  sign  up  process. Passwords here  require  selection, 
whereas text-based passwords require construction. It is also 
much simpler to explain to the user what a strong password 
is in terms of media objects such as photographs, than it is in 
terms of text. Media objects also minimize the users memory 
load, as they only require semantic clues to be remembered 
which is not usually the case for strong text-based passwords.
C. Sharing 
It is not generally recommended to share the passwords 
with anyone, but this is nevertheless an important feature of 
any password scheme. If two users have a private but pre- 
shared media library, such as a library of photographs, they 
may share a media object by sharing descriptions or cues and 
not the actual object to be used in the object hash or object- 
based scheme. The password may also be shared over a non- 
digital medium by first converting the media object into its 
text-based representation using the object hash framework. 
 
D. Backing-Up 
Text-based passwords may be noted down on a piece of 
paper by the user in case they may forget what password 
they have set.  The object hash-based scheme allows for  a 
similar possibility by allowing the user to generate a text-based 
representation of their chosen media object. Media objects may 
also be stored on backup devices. It is also very likely that 
media objects, unlike text-based passwords, are already backed 
up. Consider for e.g. a personal family vacation album that is 
already backed up on a CD-ROM. 
 
E. Security 
Object  hash  and  object-based passwords are  resistant to 
offline dictionary attacks. Considering users select a media 
object that is  not  accessible to  others (users and  attackers 
alike), attackers will find it impossible to come up with 
generalized look  up  tables.  On  the  other  hand,  commonly 
used text-based passwords are feasible to compute [13] and 
expansive dictionaries containing such passwords already exist 
[17]. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The object hash and object-based password schemes offer 
significant security benefits over text-based password schemes 
if they are used correctly. The choice between object hash 
and object based password schemes is a fairly simple one - 
the object hash framework is more efficient in performance 
(similar to text-based schemes) but requires computation to 
be performed on the client. If that computational power is 
not available, then the object based password scheme may be 
the way to go even though it will require significantly higher 
network resources and marginally higher server resources. 
The object hash and object-based frameworks may also be 
used interchangeably or in concert with one another. Mobile 
devices could load the object-based framework whereas more 
powerful systems (personal computers) could utilize the object 
hash-based framework. Using the two interchangeably will 
also allow the user to obtain the text representation of the 
media object when operating on either framework. 
It was determined through performance evaluations that 
media objects of differing file types (mp3, jpeg, doc, pdf, 
avi, txt) are hashed in virtually the same time, i.e. hashing 
times are independent of files types. Increasing file size 
does however marginally impact hashing times. This 
impact is marginal in the sense that it is dwarfed by the 
overall authentication time from the client to the server. 
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